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Standard Explanation
• Weak quality of human capital
• Uneven playing field in term of physical infrastructure
and capital ownership
• Lack of access to productive employment opportunities
• Inadequate provision of social safety nets
• Low effectiveness and efficiency of (local) government
spending
• Bias central government policies
• Remoteness
• Conflicts
Targeted national development policies
• Both supply and demand side
interventions, such as
– Provision of better school and health services
– Transfer of fund
• Aim to reach the poor
• Based on international experiences
 Limited success Village
Development Program: 2014 Village Law
Village Development Program in
Indonesia
• One typical argument is that rural areas lack the necessary capital to
develop their economy (Lewis, 1954; Harris-Todaro, 1970)
• Previous programs:
– Ag Credit, such as Padi Sentra (1959-65), BIMAS (1965-85),
KUT (1985-99), KKP (2000-now): Microcredits at individual
farmer level
– IDT (93/94-96/97): Microcredits at village level for individuals
– KDP (1998-2006): Grants at sub-district level for initiatives from
villages within sub-district
• Moving from microcredits to grants, individual to community, top-
bottom in selection to bottom-up, and increasing accountability
National Program: PNPM Mandiri
• National Program for Community Empowerment (2007):
– Core: (1) Rural (KDP), (2) Urban (P2KP since 1999), (3) Poor &
Disadvantaged Areas, (4) Rural infrastructure, and (5) Socio-
economic infrastructure
– Support: (1) Health and education, (2) natural resource
management, (3) agricultural development etc.
• Grants are delivered to sub-district governments and
villages within the sub-district allowed to bid for projects
to be funded
– Not all villages receive these grants (+/- 75% in rural areas; +/-
20% in urban areas)
Village Strategic Development Program
• RESPEK (or PNPM RESPEK) means to “drop” grants to all villages
to develop capital needed to develop rural areas:
– Rp 100 million (US$10,000) annually to all villages in Papua and
West Papua*; starting 2008
– Gives village people considerable freedom, through village
meetings (musyawarah desa), to make their own decisions
about the areas in which they want to build capital; though
government expectation is that the areas they choose will be:
• nutrition and food security, education, primary health care, village
infrastructure, and economic livelihood.
– Also gear up toward community driven development
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Much freedom in making decision, but accountable Almost no opportunity for red tapes
Challenges
• Accurate information on what
PNPM is and how to
implement it:
– Quality of sub-district
government officials
– Quality of village head
– Quality of facilitator
– Village topography
– Access to media
– Education in general
• Appropriate decisions on the
use of funding:
– Village elite capture
– Quality of village leader
– Quality of facilitator
– Education in general
• Good implementation of the
activities
– Quality of village leader
– Availability and prices of
materials
– Village topography
– Distance to the closest
municipality
– Quality of facilitator
• High and effective utilization of
the product
– Elite capture
– Quality of the product
PSKK-UGM, 2010; Akatiga, 2011
Village Law: Law 6/2014
• Empowering village institutions:
– Head of village is accountable to BPD and village
assembly (village representative board) and so no
more to head of district)
• All villages in Indonesia annually receive Village
Funds (Dana Desa): 10% of regional transfer
budget for all villages approximately Rp 1
billion or US$100,000 annually per village
– The first Village Fund was in 2015
Village Funding
• In 2015 Fund distributed; while PNPM facilitators are not hired:
– No independent accountability on the use of fund
– No supports for local decision making
• In 2016 Ministry of Village, Development of Disadvantaged Regions
and Transmigration attempted to rebuild village facilitators
– No independent accountability on the use of fund
– Less supports for local decision making
• No much action to resolve previous challenges:
– Accurate information on how to implement Village Fund
– Appropriate decisions on the use of funding
– Good implementation of the activities
– High and effective utilization of the product
 Elite capture
Literature
• Elite capture phenomena (theory):
– Through capturing the key factors of production; i.e. ownership of
land and other capitals
– Through capturing the local powers; i.e. local governments or
informal (adat) institutions
– Through capturing local rules or norms
Wade (1982); Dreze and Sen (1989); Bardhan and Mookherjee
(2000); Acemoglu (2006); Acemoglu and Johnson (2006) and
Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson (2012)
Traditional Social Institution
• Tradition division among members of the
(local) societies
– Feudalism
– Manorialism
– Religious classes, etc.
• Have been established for years (pre-
colonial period)
• In different forms, but relatively still intact in
many Eastern Indonesia’s small islands and
in Papua
• Why? Most likely due to relative remoteness
and isolation
• Need to take into account the impact of the
existence of traditional institutions on
development outcomes
Two Case Studies: Bali & Sumba
Bali
• Traditional social institution in Bali: High caste (Brahmins & Ksatrias)
and Others
• Traditional social institution in Bali does impact individual year of
schooling; i.e. the quality of human capital
High caste Others
N Mean N Mean
Year of school 1,085 9.39 7,304 7.42
Age 1,085 37.44 7,304 36.91
Female 1,085 0.51 7,304 0.51
Number of schools
in a district (x100) 1,085 1.23 7,304 1.32
Susenas in 2002
Sumba
• Traditional social institution in Sumba: Nobilities, Commoners and
Servants
• Traditional social institution in Sumba does impact individual year of
schooling; i.e. the quality of human capital (but not that for height)
Variable Definition
Mean
Nobility Commoner Servant
Years of
schooling
(YOS)
From 0 (never enrolled) to 16
(University graduate) 10.01 7.370 7.295
Highest
educational
attainment:
No degree 0.128 0.273 0.290
Completed Year 6 0.246 0.414 0.400
Completed Year 9 0.124 0.099 0.086
Completed Year 12 0.307 0.141 0.141
Completed University degree 0.194 0.071 0.082
Height Body height, centimetre 159.4 156.9 159.1
Own survey
Education vs High Caste Power in Bali
Final Remarks
• Persistence of rural-urban development gaps in
Indonesia
• Limited success of national development program
targeted to the poor
• Some success of village development program: PNPM
• Village Law in 2014
– Strengthening village institutions
– Provision of large grant at village level: Village Fund (Dana Desa)
• Challenges remains
– Accurate information on how to implement Village Fund
– Appropriate decisions on the use of funding
– Good implementation of the activities
– High and effective utilization of the product
 How to eliminate Elite capture
